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ABSTRACT
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The Determinants of Municipal Minimum Wage Ordinances:
An Analysis of 100 Large Cities from 2012-2017
by
Nicholas S. Hilton, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2019
Major Professor: Dr. Peter McNamara
Department: Political Science
The city of Seattle, Washington made headlines in 2014 when its city
council enacted the highest minimum wage in the history of the United States.
The ruling appeared to begin a trend as similar policies began diffusing in cities
across the country. In reality, however, municipal minimum wage ordinances have
existed since the early 1990’s. Yet, despite over two decade’s worth of data on the
subject, little research has been conducted to understand the characteristics that
influence cities to enact minimum wages in the first place. This study contributes
to our understanding of the predictors of minimum wage ordinances by retesting
prior variables of significance over a more recent time period, while also
introducing a new set of variables to the literature. I find that cities with an
increased percentage of residents with bachelor’s degrees face an increased
likelihood for future policy adoption. Additionally, I find that some age

demographics may be significant predictors in future studies of minimum wage.
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INTRODUCTION
The city of Seattle, Washington made headlines in 2014 when it
implemented one of the highest minimum wage increases in US history (Cohen,
2014). The ruling requires that all businesses pay employees no less than $15 per
hour by 2021 (Wallace, 2014). The act sparked national conversation and appeared
to start a movement as 24 other U.S. cities followed suit and considered similar
proposals, 18 of which voted in favor of adoption as of April 2016 (National
Employment Law Project, 2016). Further research, however, shows that the
adoption of municipal wage ordinances began long before Seattle, yet little is
known as to why some cities embrace these policies and others do not (Clain,
2012).
This research examines city characteristics that may increase the odds that
cities enact minimum wage legislation. Most municipal-level studies focus on the
effects of policy changes, but few studies have examined the factors that actually
influence policy implementation in the first place (Clain, 2012; Martin, 2006). This
study contributes to our understanding of municipal minimum wage ordinances
by testing the influence young populations have on the odds of ordinance
enactment. I theorize that cities with larger youth populations face increased odds
of enacting wage increases, based on findings in the crisis of democracy literature
that have yet to be introduced to studies on minimum wage. First, I survey the
literature to develop my theory and identify prominent variables. I then explain

my assumptions and test my predictions using a series of logistic and linear
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regression models, as well as a classification tree.
A NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR INCREASED WAGES
The development of city wage ordinances is a relatively new political
phenomenon that is rapidly diffusing across the United States. Baltimore,
Maryland was the first to enact what was termed a “living wage” in 1994, and
within 12 years, over 100 U.S. cities had followed suit (Bernstein, 2004; Martin,
2006). This new term gave birth to the living wage movement, and characterized
municipal policies that differ significantly from state and federal wage laws. Rather
than simply establishing a price floor for all workers in a geographic region, living
wage ordinances focus only on a select set of workers.
The development of limited wage intervention calmed the fears of
minimum wage critics and ensured the longevity of the living wage movement,
which continues through the time of this study with no signs of stopping
(Bernstein, 2004; Clain, 2012; Swarts & Vasi, 2011). While a small number of states
do prohibit cities from enacting wage ordinances at all, most have the discretion to
make the policy’s coverage as broad or narrow as they see fit (Bergal, 2015; Clain,
2012). It is easy, therefore, to see why academics studying living wage ordinances
agree that “no two are the same” (Bernstein, 2004, p. 100). Some living wage
ordinances may only apply to part-time employees, some may apply to full-time
employees, while others may apply only to employees in specific industries.

Additionally, coalition groups within each city lobby for various exemptions from
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these laws, which lead to further variation (Bernstein, 2004, pp. 100-114). That
being said, however, the coverage of most municipal living wage policies is fairly
narrow and they are usually similar in one of three ways. An ordinance may apply
only to companies that contract with the city, on businesses receiving city
assistance, or they may apply only to employees of the city itself (Adams &
Neumark, 2004, p. 211; Bernstein, 2004, pp. 100-111).
The success of the living wage movement has had a variety of political
implications, one of which is the development of more all-encompassing wage
ordinances. In fact, the movement’s growth and success with living wage
ordinances has contributed to an expansion of policy coverage, as is seen by the
increasing number of cities enacting full-scale minimum wage ordinances
(Bernstein, 2004; Reich, Jacobs, & Bernhardt, 2014). These full-scale ordinances,
referred to as minimum wage ordinances, apply to all businesses within city limits
(Craigie, 2015). Following the successful spread of living wage ordinances, an
increasing number of cities began expanding their policies and altered them to
cover all businesses and employees within the geographical bounds of the city.
This trend started in 2003 with Santa Fe, New Mexico and then ratcheted up
significantly after nationwide strikes occurred in 2012 and 2013 when fast-food
workers walked off the job in protest of low wages. A variety of online platforms
surfaced at this time, encouraging grassroots activism online in favor of $15
minimum wages at all levels of government, although the organizations lacked a
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brick and mortar presence as is normally observed with interest groups (Bernstein,
2004; National Employment Law Project, 2016). As such, the influence of these
networking cites will not be present in this analysis because they do not represent
any one cohesive group, but rather represent a national presence of hashtags and
Facebook posts. All in all, the living wage movement has evolved to include both
living wages and city-wide minimum wage ordinances, which are typically
analyzed separately in the literature. For the purpose of this study, I analyze the
predictors of the city-wide minimum wage ordinances which are increasingly
growing in popularity.
THE DETERMINANTS OF MUNICIPAL WAGE ORDINANCES
The spike in the number of cities enacting living wage ordinances since
1994 prompted a number of academic studies. To date, most of these have sought
to understand the effects of such legislation, however, their disparate findings have
resulted in an overall lack of consensus (Adams & Neumark, 2004; Bartik, 2004;
Fairris, 2004; Martin, 2006). An overview of the literature on the aftereffects of any
wage policy quickly leaves readers feeling confused, and reveals that no
overarching claim can be made without being negated by a number of other
studies (Adams & Neumark, 2004). As a result, many academics continue studying
the issue while very few consider why cities actually enact any type of wage
ordinance in the first place.
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Only a handful of quantitative studies have been completed to understand
the determinants of living wage enactment at the municipal level (Clain, 2012;
Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2001, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011). Additionally,
due to the even newer emergence of city-wide minimum wage ordinances, an even
lesser number of studies have analyzed the predictors of these policies (Doussard
& Gamal, 2015), one of which applied the same methodology to the state-wide
wage hikes that began growing following the 2012 and 2013 fast food worker strikes
(Whitaker, Herian, Larimer, & Lang, 2012). It is important to note, however, that
although these two bodies
of research analyze different types of wage laws, they each analyze the influence of
the same set of predictors.
These studies all agree that political ideology is a significant predictor of
wage ordinances and suggest that cities with higher numbers of democrats are
increasingly more likely to enact these policies. Due to these findings, this study
measures the political ideology of each city using data from a study by
Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013). Additionally, the determinants research
presents a variety of significant predicting variables that fall into two camps:
variables dealing with the economic conditions of a city, and variables that
measure the presence of interest groups (Clain, 2012; Doussard & Gamal, 2015;
Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2001, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011; Whitaker et
al., 2012).

Economic Conditions
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The economic characteristics of a city have been the most significant
variables of interest in determinants research, although for different reasons
(Clain, 2012; Levin-Waldman, 2004; Martin, 2006). According to one of the most
recent studies on living wage ordinances, these are most likely to occur following
positive economic conditions as determined by measures of income,
unemployment, and the incidence of poverty (Clain, 2012). This finding, however,
is disputed by prior determinants research, as well as the research on city-wide
ordinances that followed, which find that minimum wage
ordinances are most likely to be enacted following periods of economic hardship
(Card & Krueger, 1994; Doussard & Gamal, 2015; Levin-Waldman, 2004; Martin,
2001, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011; Whitaker et al., 2012).
Suzzane Clain, from the Economics department at Villanova University,
conducted the most recent study on the determinants of municipal living wage
legislation. Clain (2012) theorized that municipal minimum wage ordinances are
more likely to occur following periods of economic well-being because citizens
know they can afford it. While there is no conclusive evidence that minimum wage
ordinances are accompanied by significant costs, some cities have certainly
experienced negative economic consequences following policy adoption (Adams &
Neumark, 2004). According to Clain’s (2012) theory, citizens are aware of these

potential costs and weigh them against any potential benefits prior to taking a
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policy stance.
While Clain’s theory and subsequent findings present an ideal form of
engaged citizenry, they are disputed by all other determinants research. All other
studies on the issue provide empirical evidence that economic hardship is the
actual influencing factor spurring policy adoption (Card & Krueger, 1994; Doussard
& Gamal, 2015; Levin-Waldman, 2004; Martin, 2006; Swarts & Vasi, 2011; Whitaker
et al., 2012). In an analysis of 60 cities, Levin-Waldman (2004) observed that cities
with high levels of minority populations and low levels of educational attainment
faced an increased predisposition to adopt living wage policies; findings which
were further compounded by rising income inequality. Later research confirmed
Levin-Waldman’s (2004) observation and found that cities with lower average
incomes, increased unemployment, and higher incidents of poverty are more likely
to enact living wage ordinances (Levin-Waldman, 2008; Martin, 2006).
Clain’s theory of mindful and beneficent citizens is also disputed by public
choice theory, which suggests that human beings are rationally self-interested,
rather than solely altruistic, and that they maximize their benefits while
minimizing their costs (Shughart, 2008; Simmons, 2011). If this is the case, then the
supporters of wage ordinances are likely to be those who stand to personally gain
from the policies. This would be those covered by either living wage ordinances or
city-wide ordinances, rather than those who are either (a) not covered by a living
wage ordinance, or (b) earn a wage higher than the proposed minimum wage

ordinance. We would expect those who will not benefit from a wage ordinance to
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reject it on grounds that it raises their costs without providing them with a benefit.
Conversely, we would expect ordinance supporters to be those who would be
covered by a living wage ordinance, or be those who make less than the proposed
city-wide wage increase, which would be those who suffer from things like
unemployment, low income, and low educational attainment (Card & Krueger,
1994; Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2006).
Additionally, James Buchanan’s theory of the fiscal gap suggests that
citizens behave in exact opposition to what is presented by Clain (Buchanan,
1999). According to Buchanan, a gap exists in the minds of voters. Rather than
thinking of taxes and expenditures simultaneously, the decision process is isolated
for each. He explains this by arguing that citizens frequently vote in favor of
receiving increased government benefits, while simultaneously voting against the
very tax proposals that would fund those benefits (Buchanan, 1999). When applied
to the literature on minimum wage, Buchanan’s idea contradicts Clain by positing
that citizens don’t actually consider the costs of minimum wage ordinances at all,
and if even if they did, they would vote against any policy that raises their costs.
Despite the abovementioned contradictions to Clain’s work, it is still a
valuable contribution to the determinants literature in that it suggests more
testing is necessary to better understand the influence of economic characteristics
on the likelihood of policy adoption. Each study in the determinants literature
finds that the economic characteristics of a city are variables of significance,

although for varying reasons. As such, this study retests these variables utilizing
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the theories that have garnered the most widespread support in the determinants
literature: that wage ordinances are most likely to be enacted following periods of
economic downturn. Retesting this theory furthers our understanding of how
economic city characteristics may influence the passage of minimum wage
ordinances.
In accordance with the prior literature, I measure the economic
characteristics of each city by analyzing unemployment rates, the percent of the
population who are minorities, the percent of the population who fall below the
poverty level, the percent of the population with a high school education and the
percent with a bachelor’s degree (Clain, 2012; Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008; Martin,
2001, 2006). Additionally, I add a measure of population growth to determine the
economic attractiveness of the city. More information on these measures can be
found in the data and methodology portion of this study.
Interest Group Power
Early studies on the determinants of living wage ordinances found the
presence of interest groups to be a significant variable of interest, and concluded
that interest groups are a primary source of diffusion for living wage ordinances
across the country (Martin, 2001, 2006). There are a myriad of interest groups that
could influence the passage of wage ordinances, however, interest groups would
need to be uniform across all cities for comprehensive analysis. Due to the diverse

nature of interest groups, studies on the determinants of wage ordinances have
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largely only been able to focus on two types of interest groups: the presence of
labor unions and the presence of chapters of the Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN; Clain, 2012; Martin, 2006).
Unions possess significant collective bargaining power as interest groups,
and use that power to influence policy changes to the benefit of their members
(Doussard & Gamal, 2015). Additionally, unions are uniquely capable of engaging a
wide number of voters directly through their membership, which better enables
them to garner public support and influence political decisions (Green, Gerber, &
Nickerson, 2003). Labor unions typically work to secure higher wages for their
members and as a result have been observed to support living wage ordinances
and use their membership to lobby in favor of those ordinances (Clain, 2012; LevinWaldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2001, 2006). Because of this, cities with an increased
percentage of union members are expected to face an increased odds of enacting
minimum wage legislation. This variable is similar to political ideology in the fact
that union members tend to be liberal voters, but it is a unique measure of interest
group power as well.
Early studies on the determinants of wage legislation found that the
presence of an ACORN chapter increased the likelihood that cities would adopt
wage ordinances (Martin, 2001, 2006). ACORN was thought to be significant for
the same reasons that union density was significant—it was a liberally oriented
interest group. Additionally, it was a relatively easy interest group to observe
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across municipalities due to its uniformity as a national network of local chapters.
This is no longer the case, however, because the organization collapsed after an
embezzlement scandal in 2010 (Smith, 2010). Consequently, studies taking place
after the collapse of ACORN were no longer able to use this measure of
community action organizations (Clain, 2012).
Other interest groups may be worth analyzing in future determinants
studies so long as they are consistent across each observed city. In many instances,
however, analyzing the influence of these organizations may be inappropriate
predictors for enactment due to their endogenous relationship with population
size and ideology (Clain, 2012). That is not to say that there are no other interest
groups that could be included in future determinants research so long as there is a
clear theory linking the interest group to the outcome of interest, and so long as
the interest group is uniformly present across all cities. Coincidentally, one interest
group fits this description and has not yet been introduced to the study of
minimum wage ordinances: younger generations.
The Young and The Crisis of Democracy
Age has been found to be a significant predictor of political activity
(Campbell, 2003). Senior citizens, for example, under the banner of the American
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), are considered one of the largest and most
effective interest groups in the country (Campbell, 2002). No rational politician
would consider cutting social security benefits due to the expected outcry from the

AARP. Simply put, policy makers are receptive to increased voter participation,
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and when specific groups increase their participation, they are more likely to see
their preferred policies enacted (Campbell, 2003; Griffin & Newman, 2005).
Despite age playing such a large role in other political issues, however, studies on
the determinants of wage ordinances have yet to consider age as a primary variable
of interest.
The age groups within municipal populations have been considered as
secondary variables of interest in some determinants research, and in fact, limited
evidence suggests that cities with increased numbers of younger populations are
more likely to adopt minimum wage ordinances (Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008).
These studies, however, give no theoretical background for the inclusion of the age
variable and also present conflicting evidence by suggesting that cities with large
numbers of elderly populations are more likely to enact living wage ordinances
(Levin-Waldman, 2004, 2008). These conflicting findings and the overall lack of
theory resulted in the variable of age being dropped from consequent studies
(Clain, 2012; Doussard & Gamal, 2015; Swarts & Vasi, 2011; Whitaker et al., 2012). A
theory for the inclusion of an age variable, however, can be found using a public
choice framework and the crisis of democracy literature (Clain, 2012; Dalton, 2016).
First and foremost, young people have more to gain from municipal
minimum wage ordinances than their older counterparts. They have less work
experience and fewer years of education, which limits their earning potential and
makes them more susceptible to unemployment (Mincer, 1974; U.S. Bureau of
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Labor Statistics, 2013). Additionally, young people frequently work low-paying jobs
while accruing significant amounts of student loan debt, the average of which is
approximately $27,000 for a bachelor’s degree (Gorman, 2015). Based on these
significant financial hurdles, I expect young citizens to be more favorable of
minimum wage ordinances simply because they promise higher wages. While
there is little conclusive evidence that minimum wage laws actually produce
economic benefits (Adams & Neumark, 2004), the mere hope for higher wages is
enough to spur young people to action.
I analyze the influence of young citizens at the city level, by first assuming
that all individuals are rationally self-interested (Mitchell, 1994). This is a central
tenet of rational choice literature, which asserts that individuals consistently seek
to maximize their personal benefits while minimizing costs (Buchanan, 1999;
Shughart, 2008). A particularly poignant example of this characteristic and its
political ramifications is found in a study that analyzed citizen’s preferences before
the 2004 presidential election. The study surveyed citizens and found they favored
electoral systems that promoted their preferred outcomes (Aldrich, Reifler, &
Munger, 2014). In this instance, citizens sought to maximize their benefits by
rigging the system in their favor, regardless of the costs imposed on those with
alternative preferences. Therefore, based on the rationality of individuals, I expect
that young voters at the local level will advocate for minimum wage ordinances
regardless of any potential costs imposed on other groups.

An initial consideration of this theory may seem to contradict empirical
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evidence on voter turnout and political activity, which indicates that voter turnout
is extraordinarily low at the local level, and young voters, in particular, are largely
absent from the political arena (Dalton, 2016, pp. 64-65). I argue, however, that
young voters matter for two reasons. First, even if it is true that young voters are
largely absent from the political arena, they are rational and likely to mobilize
when the benefits of action are high. In this case, youth populations are likely to
advocate for minimum wage ordinances at the city level, and very few of them
actually need to mobilize in order to have an impact due to lower turnout overall.
Therefore, young populations can be an influential interest group at the local level
because there are fewer political participants overall and less competition. As a
result, when there are larger number of young voters in a city, who are upset by
low wages, they are better able to successfully lobby for minimum wage
ordinances. Fewer competitors in the formal political arena, however, is only a
portion of the equation.
The second portion of the equation that makes young populations matter
stems from growing body of research in the crisis of democracy literature, which
suggests that young people are actually very politically involved, but in ways that
have not been previously considered by political commentators and researchers
(Dalton, 2016). In Russell J. Dalton’s (2016) The Good Citizen: How a Younger
Generation is Reshaping American Politics, he addresses the commonly held belief
that American democracy is in trouble due to falling participation rates in younger
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populations. While many political commentators disparage young Americans and
blame them for their lack of participation, Dalton gives a more hopeful message
and finds that not only are young Americans becoming more politically involved,
but that younger generations across the world are becoming more politically
involved, just in different ways than the generations that came before them
(Dalton, 2016). Dalton’s contribution is one of a number of studies in both
sociological and political literature that shows how norms of political behavior are
changing across generations (Anduiza, Jensen, & Jorba, 2012; Dalton, 2013; Norris,
2002; Stolle & Micheletti, 2013; Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Delli Carpini,
2006).
Social modernization has led to a change in generational citizenship norms
over time (Dalton, 2016, p. 56). As outlined in Appendix A, American’s views of
what makes a good citizen have transformed due to changing social conditions,
such as rising levels of education and higher living standards. Older Americans,
who grew up during different social conditions than their younger counterparts,
tend to have duty-based norms of citizenship. They tend to view good citizens as
those who do things like serve in the military, vote in elections, and respectfully
defer to government officials. Younger Americans, on the other hand, are more
likely to view themselves as good citizens if they are more engaged with their
communities through things like protests, community service, and direct political
action. These differences in citizenship values have been observed across
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generations, and lead members of separate generations to act different politically
(Dalton, 2016, p. 56-59; Norris, 2002; Zukin et al., 2006).
According to Dalton, members of Generation X and Millennials are more
likely to care for the social well-being of others, and this trait is expected to be
even stronger among Millennials in particular (Dalton, 2016). Additionally,
members of younger generations are more likely to promote active government
policies than members of earlier generations such as the Baby Boomers (Dalton,
2016). With this in mind, it is assumed that the Americans in Generation X and the
millennial generation will be more likely to favor minimum wage ordinances
because these policies are viewed as helpful for low earning people. Indeed, this
may be part of the reason that minimum wage ordinances began diffusing in the
first place during the early 1990’s, as members of generation x began reaching
political age (Fry, 2018). However, no study on the determinants of municipal wage
ordinances has sought to understand the impact of millennials now that they have
reached political age.
Based on these findings in the literature, I theorize that the presence of
millennials is a significant predictor of municipal minimum wage ordinances
because they are maximizing their preferences on two fronts. On the one hand,
they generally stand to gain more from policy adoption and therefore can be
expected to advocate for minimum wage ordinances in order to receive these
perceived benefits. Additionally, however, millennials are more likely to favor
minimum wage ordinances due to their predisposition towards having engaged
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citizenship norms, which favor active government policies that promise to care for
the less advantaged in society. This study therefore contributes to the
determinants literature by examining the influence generational differences have
on the adoption of municipal minimum wage ordinances in the United States, a
phenomenon that has yet to be considered as a possible predictor of municipal
minimum wage ordinances
DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY
Most of the research on the determinants of municipal wage ordinances
took place before millennials reached political age in 2016 (Clain, 2012; LevinWaldman, 2004, 2008; Martin, 2001, 2006) and the remaining study that could
have captured at least part of the millennial influence do not test any age variables
(Doussard & Gamal, 2015). This leaves a significant gap in our understanding of
their influence, which is especially problematic considering the fact that
millennials and post-millennials have rapidly bypassed previous generations in
terms of population size, as observed in figure 2 (Dalton, 2016, pp. 10-13; Fry, 2018).
As a result, this study analyzes the impact of younger generations by examining
the 100 largest cities in the United States from 2012-2017. The 100 largest cities are
the focus of this study because they provide the most updated and accurate data
for observation at the city level, the data of which can be notoriously difficult to
find. Additionally, the time frame for this study was selected because it provides

the most recent measurements available that capture the full influence of
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millennial voters.
As determined by the data outlined in Appendix B, all members of the
millennial generation have now reached political age as of 2016. This enables the
study of their influence on minimum wage ordinances using 2010 census data,
which also have not been utilized in any determinants research to date (Clain,
2012). As such, generational composition is the primary variable of interest for this
study and the influence of each generation will be compared against the other
variables of interest presented in the determinants literature; namely,
measurements of economic vitality and the presence of other interest groups and
demographics.
I consider two dependent variables across 10 different models, which are
outlined in Figure 1. One dependent variable is categorical and measures whether
or not a city enacts a minimum wage ordinance at any point from 2012 to the time
of this study. The second dependent variable is continuous and measures the
percent increase of minimum wages for cities that enacted them. In other words,
my second dependent variable measures the effect of each independent variable
on the magnitude of minimum wage increases across my sample. Data for these
two variables were gathered from the National Employment Law Project (2016)
and the UC Berkeley Labor Center’s (2019) inventory of local minimum wage
ordinances, as were measurements of state minimum wage laws. Unless otherwise

stated, all remaining information on the specifics of each wage ordinance were
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gathered directly from city records.
My principle model is a full logistic regression that measures 17
independent variables against the dependent variable of whether a city enacts a
minimum wage ordinance. This data set includes observations for 100 U.S. cities, 15
of which enacted minimum wage ordinances. Due to this limited number of
observations, and an even smaller set of cities within my sample that enacted
minimum wage, I run three other logistic regressions that further divide my data
into categories. Doing so enables an increase in the degrees of freedom present for
analysis, and improves the accuracy of inferences from my results. These separate
categories for these models are outlined in Figure 1 and are (a) economic variables,
(b) demographic variables, and (c) generational variables, the last model of which
will drop the measure of post-millennials as a means of comparison.
In addition to the traditional logistic regression methods, I run a
classification tree to better filter out possible interactions or collinearity between
my variables. This is a nuanced approach to studying the predictors of minimum
wage enactment that has yet to be implemented in the literature. Additionally, this
method may improve the quality of my results while also improving their overall
interpretability by presenting findings in a more intuitive graphic form. The results
of this classification tree will therefore be compared to the results from each other
model to look for and identify patterns in the data that can improve our overall
understanding of the determinants of minimum wage ordinances.
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To analyze my second dependent variable, the magnitude of wage change, I
apply three linear regressions that incorporate the same variable categories as
mentioned above. A detailed description of these categories can also be found in
Figure 1. I use this method to bypass the limitations of linear regression, which
cannot be completed if there are more predictors than there are observations.
Fifteen of the cities within my sample enacted minimum wage ordinances between
2012 to 2017, and there are a total of 17 independent variables in question. The large
number of predictors and relatively low number of observations for analysis
therefore requires the categorization of variables in order to determine any
existing relationship between them and the magnitude of minimum wage
increases in my sample of cities.
In the final stage of my analysis, I will re-evaluate my models and findings
to analyze the relationships between my most significant variables against both
dependent variables. This will be done in the form of both a logistic and linear
regression, which are highlighted in Figure 1. Doing this enables me to compare
the significance of each finding deemed significant by prior models, thereby
furthering an overall understanding of the predictors of minimum wage
ordinances by identifying not only the significant variables, but identifying those
who are most significant when compared to each other. This process is commonly
used in studies of public health, and is applied as a means to add rigor to my
findings.
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Data used to identify the 100 largest cities by 2010 population and to obtain
measurements of population growth were gathered from the City Mayors Statistics
(2018) ranking of the 100 largest cities. Measurements for purchasing power were
gathered using state-level regional pricing data provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (2019) within the U.S. Department of Commerce. Data on the
percent of union members was gathered using state-level data provided by Hirsch,
Macpherson, and Vroman’s (2001) dataset on union density by state. Data for city
ideology was gathered from the American Ideology Project created by
Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013), with the exceptions of measurements for cities
within Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Oregon. Missing ideological measures for
these cities were gathered using state elections results for the November 2008
presidential election (Kentucky State Board of Elections, 2019; Massachusetts
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 2019; Oregon Secretary of State, 2008;
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, 2013). All other measurements were gathered from the
American Fact Finder using 2010 Census data, including generational
measurements which were gathered by collapsing age variables according to the
generational measurements provided by the Pew Research Center (Fry, 2018; U.S.
Census Bureau, 2010).
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Figure 1. All models and corresponding variables.

My two primary hypotheses are outlined below. In addition to these, I have
a secondary interest in a variety of relationships in accordance with prior
literature. I expect that a decline in economic measurements will be associated

with increased odds of policy adoption. Similarly, I expect that an increase in the
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liberal ideology of a city and an increase in the density of union members will be
associated with increased odds of policy adoption. In all, I expect to find that cities
with low levels of per capita income, higher levels of poverty, lower levels of
population growth, and higher unemployment will face increased odds for
enacting minimum wage ordinances. Additionally, I expect that cities with larger
populations of minorities, low levels of education, and a higher density of union
members will face increased odds of policy adoption. I control for political
ideology, state minimum wage laws, and purchasing power across all models.
Table 1
Primary Hypotheses for Minimum Wage Enactment
Primary Null Hypothesis
(Minimum Wage Enactment)

Primary Alternative Hypothesis
(Minimum Wage Enactment)

An increased percentage of
millennials in a municipality will not
be associated with increased
probability for policy adoption.
Cities with an increased percentage of
millennials will be associated with an
increased probability for policy
adoption.
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Table 2
Primary Null Hypotheses
Primary Null Hypothesis
(Magnitude of Wage Change)

Of the cities that enact minimum
wage ordinances, those with an
increased percentage of millennials in
a municipality will not be associated
with an increased magnitude of wage
change.

Primary Alternative Hypothesis
(Magnitude of Wage Change)

Of the cities that enact minimum
wage ordinances, those with an
increased percentage of millennials
will be associated with an increased
magnitude of wage change.

RESULTS
Two of the initial regression models presented results that were statistically
significant at the 95% confidence interval. These models included the general
logistic regression with all variables, and the economic logistic regression. The
general model found that each measure of education was significant, as well as the
presence of the silent generation; while the economic logistic model found that
ideology was a significant predictor. This information is outlined in figure six,
which also highlights the significant variables found by the classification tree that
include both measures of education, percent population growth, and the percent
of union members. The figure also highlights the variables found to be significant
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at the 90% confidence interval because these variables were used to structure one
last logistic regression to address the issue of multicollinearity.
I use all variables that showed any level of statistical significance at or above
the 90% confidence interval to create one final logistic regression. This practice is
commonplace in public health studies seeking to explore the interplay between
variables of any significance. These variables are noted in figure 6 along with the
results of the final regression, which has been shaded red to improve overall
interpretability. The results of this final logistic model reveal each measure of
education to be statistically significant, as well as the median age of the population
and the percent population growth. Interestingly, the silent generation lost
significance under this model, which indicates its lesser importance for
understanding the relationships in this sample of data, while the median age
variable increased in significance.
In addition to one final logistic regression, I use the same practice to create
a final linear regression to measure the impact of my most significant variable (the
percent of residents with bachelor’s degrees) on the magnitude of wage increases.
To measure this, and because this linear regression was limited to 15 observations
of cities that had enacted minimum wage increases, only the most significant
variable found from the final logistic regression of statistically significant variables
was included: the percent of residents with a bachelor’s degree. This maximizes
degrees of freedom and makes best use of the small number of observations that
actually enacted minimum wage ordinances. This regression, however, resulted in
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no statistical significance despite the increased degrees of freedom provided by the
model, but is shaded red in Figure 2 nonetheless.

Figure 2. All models, variables, and relative significance.
Appendix C displays the significant findings from the classification tree.
The classification tree uses algorithmic statistical techniques that analyzed all
independent variables to classify cities that enacted minimum wages from those
that did not. It found that the percent of union members was the most significant
variable, followed by the percent of residents with bachelor’s degrees and those
with high school diplomas. The percent population growth of each city was also
deemed significant, but to a lesser extent than all other variables.
The classification tree analyzed all data and grouped them according to the
branches on the tree. Therefore, by starting at the most significant variable, union
percent, it is evident that 45 of the cities in my dataset did not enact minimum
wage ordinances. The remaining cities that did enact city-wide minimum wage

ordinances had union percentages that were higher than 7.2%. Appendix D
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outlines how two branches of the tree interact with one another. As can be seen,
the upper right category of the plot captures the majority of the cities that enacted
minimum wage ordinances, and these cities held higher rates of union percent and
the percent of residents with bachelor’s degrees.
Table 3
Classification Tree Predictive Accuracy
Category
Percent Correctly Classified
Specificity
Sensitivity
Area Under Curve (AUC)

Statistic
82%
94.12%
13.11%
.77

Figure 3. Confusion matrix for classification tree.

Table 3 and Figure 3 above display the predictive accuracy and the
confusion matrix for the classification tree, which indicate that the model fits my
data well and correctly classified 82% of my data. The model does well to classify
which cities do not enact minimum wage over those that do, however, there are
some false negatives. Thirteen of the fifteen cities that enacted minimum wage
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were misclassified. Despite the high number of false negatives as evidenced by the
low sensitivity in Table 5, the model does show accurately that union membership
and percent bachelor’s degrees are important.
ANALYSIS
This study was initiated under two assumptions based on theoretical
contributions from the rational choice literature and literature on the crisis of
democracy. In terms of the former, I initiated this study under the assumption that
people are generally rationally-self-interested. As such, people can be expected to
support public policies that maximize their benefits while minimizing their costs.
Under this assumption, I anticipated finding that cities with higher youth
populations would face an increased odds of enacting city-wide minimum wage
ordinances, due to the fact that youth populations are more likely to work jobs
that are at or below minimum wage rates. Similarly, I expected that cities with
depressed economic characteristics would face higher odds of enacting minimum
wage ordinances.
While most of my economic measures, such as per capita income and
unemployment, were not found to be statistically significant, I did find
significance for population growth. According to my most rigorous logistic model,
which included all variables with at least some significance, cities in my sample
with a 1% increase in population growth were observed to face a 55% decrease in
the odds for policy enactment. These results are displayed in Table 7 and suggest

that cities experiencing population growth are less likely to enact city-wide
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minimum wage ordinances. It is interesting, however, that my other economic
measures were not found to be statistically significant. This could be due to
multicollinearity (between population growth and the other economic measures)
and my small sample size. Future studies, therefore, should consider the variable
of population growth over a wider sample size to better discern its predictability.
In terms of age, none of the generational variables were found to be
statistically significant other than the presence of the silent generation, which lost
significance in the later more rigorous models. The significance of the variable for
median age, however, was determined to be significant and provides support for
the rational-choice-based assumption that younger citizens are more likely to
favor minimum wage ordinances. As is seen in Table 4, cities with a 1% increase in
median age faced over a 45% decreased odds for enacting minimum wage
ordinances. Although the impact of millennials in particular was not significant,
taken altogether, it is evident that a higher concentration of younger individuals
increases the odds of enacting municipal minimum wage ordinances. This is likely
due to their perceived gains from policy enactment because their older
counterparts generally work higher paying jobs. Additionally, however, this finding
also provides support for my second assumption that cities with larger populations
of youthful citizens face increased odds of enacting city-wide minimum wage
ordinances.
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The finding that cities with lower median ages face increased odds of policy
adoption is congruent with the crisis of democracy literature, which suggests that
younger citizens have different norms of citizenship than their older counterparts.
According to Dalton (2016), younger citizens (and millennials in particular) are
more likely to favor active government policies that attempt to care for the less
fortunate. While I find no support in my final models for the assertion that
millennials have any measurable effect (or any generation for that matter), I do
find limited evidence supporting these claims through the significance of the
median age variable. This suggests that younger populations do have a measurable
impact on the odds of policy adoption for the cities in my sample, and suggests
that future studies should include measures of age in their analysis.
It is also important to note that median age variable is perhaps the best
measurement of age demographics considering the presence of multicollinearity
among my generational variables, which naturally add up to one in the population.
While I did attempt to control for this by dropping the post millennial generation,
the multicollinearity could be manifesting itself nonetheless, which suggests that
the variable may yield different results in future studies over a larger sample size.
My final and most significant set of findings concern my educational
measures, although they do present an interesting puzzle. My results suggest that
cities with lower numbers of high school graduates are more likely to enact
minimum wage ordinances. At the same time, I find that cities with a 1% increase
in residents with bachelor’s degrees face increased odds of policy adoption by 24%.
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What could be happening between these two groups? Why would people on both
ends of the educational spectrum support minimum wage ordinances? It makes
sense for those without high school diplomas to support minimum wage
ordinances because they stand to gain more in higher wages. We would expect
those with bachelor’s degrees, however, to either be indifferent towards or against
minimum wage ordinances if we only use a rational-choice framework.
If we solely use a rational-choice framework to analyze the predictors of
minimum wage ordinances, the influence of those with bachelor’s degrees is
surprising. After all, if these people favor enacting a minimum wage, then they are
supporting a policy that provides others with benefits while potentially imposing
costs on themselves. Augmenting this view with the literature on engaged
citizenship, and considering the significance of the median age variable, however,
suggests that young voters are maximizing their preferences on two fronts. On the
one hand, young citizens without high school degrees are influencing the passage
of minimum wage ordinances because they stand to gain economically. On the
other hand, young citizens with bachelor’s degrees are influencing the passage of
minimum wage ordinances based on their preferences for active government
policies that seek to care for the less fortunate.
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Table 4
Significant Findings
Variable

Odds
Ratio

% Bachelor’s

1.246

95% CI
2.5%
97.5%
1.103
1.407

% High School
Median Age
% Pop Growth

.844
.544
.448

.705
.336
.255

.994
.880
.789

Percent
24% inc
15.6% dec
45.6% dec
55.2% dec

95% CI
2.5%
97.5%
10.3% inc 40.7% inc
29.5% dec
66.4% dec
74.5% dec

.6% dec
12% dec
21.1% dec

Lastly, as expected, political ideology remains a significant predictor of
policy adoption as is the density of union membership. This is consistent with
prior determinants research and explained by the fact that minimum wage
ordinances are liberal policies and the sole purpose of unions is to improve the
wages and conditions for their workers.
The 15 cities that adopted minimum wage ordinances share little else of
significance in common other than the findings mentioned above. As previously
stated in the literature, “no two [ordinances] are the same” (Bernstein, 2004, p.
100). This variation is evident among this sample through the fact that some cities
include both a minimum wage and a subminimum wage for tipped employees,
while some include incentives for healthcare coverage, the use of local consumer
price indexes as opposed to regional or nation, or the use of different phases of
wage increases. That being said, it is noteworthy that nine of the 15 cities are
located in the western United States, and the majority of those (six) are found
within the state of California.
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Table 5
Cities That Enacted Minimum Wage Ordinances
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

City
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Chicago, Illinois
Kansas City, Missouri
Lexington-Fayette, Kentucky
Los Angeles, California
Louisville, Kentucky
Oakland, California
Portland, Oregon
Sacramento, California
San Diego, California
San Francisco, California
San Jose, California
Seattle, Washington
St. Louis, Missouri
Washington, DC

CONCLUSION
I find no evidence to support my hypothesis that an increased percentage of
millennials in a municipality will be associated with increased odds for policy
adoption. Similarly, I find no evidence to support my hypothesis that cities with an
increased percentage of millennials will be associated with an increased magnitude
of minimum wage changes. As a result, I fail to reject each of my primary null
hypotheses regarding the impact of millennial voters. Interestingly, however, my
results indicate that the age composition within city populations may still be a
significant predictor of minimum wage ordinances. Cities with a lower median age
were observed to face an increased likelihood for enacting minimum wage

ordinances. This finding suggests that future studies of the determinants of
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minimum wage ordinances should consider age as a possible predictor.
In terms of my secondary variables of interest, I find evidence supporting
the hypothesis that cities are more likely to enact minimum wage ordinances
following periods of economic downturn, or at least during periods of declining
economic growth. This contributes to our understanding of minimum wage
ordinances by finding support for the original economic theories presented in the
determinants literature, rather than the theory advanced by Clain (2012), which
posited the opposite relationship. My most significant findings, however, suggest
that minimum wage ordinances are more likely to be enacted among cities with
higher rates of bachelor’s degrees. Perhaps then, considering the ever-growing
number of bachelor’s degrees being awarded throughout the United States, the
incidence of cities enacting minimum wage ordinances will continue its upward
trajectory.
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The Changing American Public

Note. From The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American
Politics (2nd ed, p. 5), by R. J. Dalton, 2016, Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Copyright © 2016 by CQ Press. Reprinted with permission.
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Births Underlying Each Generation

Note. From “Millennials Projected to Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest
Generation,” by R. Fry, 2016, Pew Research Center (https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/03/01/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers). Reprinted with permission.
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Appendix D
Correlation Scatter Plot for Classification Tree
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Appendix E
Additional Tables

Table 6
Full Logistic Regression Model Parameter Estimates
Coefficient

Estimate

SE

Intercept
-1.741e+01 8.227e+01
Percent White
-1.741e+01 8.227e+01
Purchasing Power
-1.055e-01 9.971e-02
Percent Below Poverty Level 3.376e+01 1.844e+01
Percent Population Growth
6.646e+01 4.033e+01
State Minimum Wage Higher 2.856e+00 1.784e+00
Union Percent
1.762e+00 1.118e+01
Unemployment Rate
2.953e+01 3.066e+01
Per Capita Income
4.283e-05 1.233e-04
Percent Bachelor’s
2.578e+01 1.159e+01
Percent High School
-3.105e+01 1.506e+01
Percent Democrat
5.995e+00 4.489e+00
Post Millennial
6.434e+01 7.725e+01
Millennial
5.853e+01 8.229e+01
Generation X
1.112e+02 7.340e+01
Boomers
1.732e+02 1.129e+02
Silent
2.788e+02 1.191e+02
Median Age
2.331e+00 1.317e+00

z-value Sig. Level
-0.212
-0.212
-1.058
-1.831
-1.648
1.601
0.158
0.963
0.347
2.225
-2.062
1.336
0.833
0.711
1.515
1.534
2.342
-1.769

0.8324
0.8324
0.2902
0.0671
0.0994
0.1094
0.8748
0.3355
0.7284
0.0261
0.0392
0.1817
0.4049
0.4769
0.1298
0.1249
0.0192
0.0768
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Table 7
Full Logistic Regression Odds Ratios
Coefficient
Percent White
Purchasing Power
Percent Below Poverty Level
Percent Population Growth
State Minimum Wage Higher
Union Percent
Unemployment Rate
Per Capita Income
Percent Bachelor’s
Percent High School
Percent Democrat
Post Millennial
Millennial
Generation X
Silent
Median Age

Odds

Lower 95%
CI

Upper 95%
CI

1.00036341
0.89989747
0.71344575
0.51448199
17.38590806
1.01777595
1.34357042
1.00004283
1.29404910
0.73310986
1.06178520
1.90294676
1.79550449
3.04019962
16.25050913
0.09722362

0.999476151
0.740142913
0.497049876
0.233396726
0.527217308
0.817473175
0.736656427
0.999801081
1.031141741
0.545779575
0.972360040
0.418676077
0.357873976
0.721282803
1.575217205
0.007354636

1.0012515
1.0941339
1.0240518
1.1340850
573.3305685
1.2671583
2.4505066
1.0002846
1.6239892
0.9847383
1.1594345
8.6491838
9.0083006
12.8144102
167.6461163
1.2852344

Table 8
Findings of Logistic Regression Using Only Significant Predictors
Coefficient

Estimate

SE

Intercept
Percent Bachelor’s
Percent High School
Median Age
Silent
Percent Below Poverty Level
Percent Population Growth

24.2008
22.0066
-17.7773
-0.6092
65.2828
-11.9500
-80.2795

10.0517
6.2035
8.7709
0.2456
38.2911
7.9045
28.8373

z-value
2.408
3.547
-2.027
-2.481
1.705
-1.512
-2.784

Sig. Level
0.016057
0.000389
0.042678
0.013112
0.088212
0.130588
0.005371
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Table 9
Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Using Only Significant Predictors
Coefficient
Percent Bachelor’s
Percent High School
Median Age
Silent
Percent Below Poverty Level
Percent Population Growth

Odds
1.2461586
0.8371323
0.5437650
1.9209659
0.8873644
0.4480749

Lower 95
% CI

Upper 95
% CI

1.1034924
0.7049138
0.3360205
0.9069538
0.7600087
0.2546169

1.4072696
0.9941506
0.8799474
4.0686856
1.0360612
0.7885224

Table 10
Results from Economic Logistic Regression
Coefficient
Intercept
Percent Population Growth
Unemployment Rate
Per Capita Income
Percent Below Poverty Level
Percent Democrat
Percent Population Growth
Purchasing Power

Estimate
-4.831e+00
-2.302e+01
-1.074e+01
6.593e-05
-3.218e+00
1.406e+00
5.271e+00
-1.250e-02

SE
4.253e+00
2.323e+01
1.810e+01
4.078e-05
9.637e+00
9.207e-01
2.679e+00
4.121e-02

z-value

Sig. Level

-1.136
-0.991
-0.593
1.617
-0.334
1.527
1.968
-0.303

0.2560
0.3219
0.5530
0.1059
0.7384
0.1267
0.0491
0.7616
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Table 11
Odds Ratios from Economic Logistic Regression
Coefficient

Odds

Lower 95
% CI

Upper 95
% CI

Percent Democrat 5.271081 0.02103985 10.52112

Table 12
Results from Demographic Logistic Regression
Coefficient

Estimate

SE

z-value

Sig. Level

Intercept
Percent White
Purchasing Power
Union Percent
Percent Bachelor’s
Percent High School
Percent Democrat

-3.82249
0.01993
-0.01129
11.82220
7.75891
-4.88545
3.17473

10.68761
0.02547
0.05771
7.79251
4.70922
8.19719
2.63450

-0.358
0.782
-0.196
1.517
1.648
-0.596
1.205

0.7206
0.43
0.8449
0.1292
0.0994
0.5512
0.2282
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Table 13
Results from Generational Logistic Regression Model
Coefficient
Intercept
Post Millennial
Millennial
Generation X
Boomers
Median Age
State Minimum Wage Higher
Percent Democrat
Purchasing Power

Estimate
-3.82249
-49.877489
-46.682864
-6.492547
-10.412327
-0.770801
1.386005
3.569924
0.008024

SE
10.68761
46.461357
53.102219
26.877004
47.222432
0.756616
0.886232
2.162605
0.035798

z-value
-0.358
-1.074
-0.879
-0.242
-0.220
-1.019
1.564
1.651
0.224

Sig. Level
0.7206
0.2830
0.3793
0.8091
0.8255
0.3083
0.1178
0.0988
0.8226

Table 14
Linear Regression with Percent Bachelor’s Degree
Coefficient
Intercept
Percent Bachelor’s Degree

Estimate
0.1430
0.7417

SE
0.1920
0.4818

z-value
0.745
1.539

Sig. Level
0.470
0.148
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Table 15
Generational Linear Regression
Coefficient
Intercept
Millennial
Generation X
Boomers
Silent
Median Age
State Minimum Wage Higher
Percent Democrat
Purchasing Power

Estimate

SE

t-value

Sig. Level

-0.8687999
2.8089329
7.2538879
12.0843674
9.5331357
-0.1600033
0.2097140
0.5295540
-0.0007475

2.9837996
4.5370659
6.2944663
17.2022801
8.7275185
0.1895902
0.3012912
0.5192495
0.0077823

-0.291
0.619
1.152
0.702
1.092
-0.844
0.696
1.020
-0.096

0.781
0.559
0.293
0.509
0.317
0.431
0.512
0.347
0.927

Estimate
1.125e-02
-1.008e-02
2.746
.960
1.396e-01
1.443
8.503e-06
2.992e-01

SE
6.646e-01
7.341e-03
2.358
5.752
1.751e-01
3.977
9.938e-06
4.626e-01

t-value
0.017
-1.373
1.164
1.732
0.797
0.363
0.856
0.647

Sig. Level
0.987
0.212
0.282
0.127
0.451
0.727
0.421
0.53

Table 16
Economic Linear Regression
Coefficient
Intercept
Purchasing Power
Percent Below Poverty Level
Percent Population Growth
State Minimum Wage Higher
Unemployment Rate
Per Capita Income
Percent Democrat
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Table 17
Demographic Linear Regression
Coefficient
Intercept
Percent White
Purchasing Power
Union Percent
Percent Bachelor’s
Percent High School
Percent Democrat

Estimate

SE

t-value

Sig. Level

3.334519
-0.010668
-0.013870
-0.453817
2.434982
-1.770618
-0.326040

2.114140
0.005594
0.008695
1.424129
1.070743
1.901137
0.491914

1.577
-1.907
-1.595
-0.319
2.274
-0.931
-0.663

0.1534
0.0930
0.1493
0.7581
0.0526
0.3789
0.5261

